Homeland Security does not share threats before January 6

In the dying days of Donald TrumpAccording to a government watchdog report, during the President’s presidency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) identified specific threats prior to the January 6 attack on the Capitol but did not shared that intelligence until a few days after the violent siege.

The DHS Office of Inspector General released the report on Tuesday more than a year after it launched an investigation into the “role and activities” of the department’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) “in preparing and respond to events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.”

On that day, hundreds of Trump supporters overcame police and violently broke into the Capitol building in an attempt to prevent Congress from certifying Joe Bidenwon the 2020 presidential election.

The Department of Homeland Security, as reported by the OIG, had specific intelligence regarding what would ultimately happen on January 6 but did not share that information until two days later.

“The I&A identified specific threat information related to the events of January 6, 2021, but did not release any intelligence products on these threats until January 8, 2019. 2021,” the OIG report said.

According to the results of the report:

Open source collectors in the I&A Current and Emerging Threats Center collected open source threat information but did not release any actionable information. Collectors also describe hesitation after reviewing the I&A’s report on civil unrest in the summer of 2020. Although an open source collector submitted a product for review today. January 5, 2021, I&A did not deliver the product until 2 days after the event at the US Capitol. In addition, the I&A Counterterrorism Mission Center (CTMC) has identified signs that the events of January 6, 2021 could turn violent but has not released intelligence products outside of I&A, although it did so for other events. Instead, CTMC identifies these threat metrics only for the internal I&A leadership briefing. Ultimately, the Field Operations Division (FOD) considered releasing intelligence products at least three times before January 6, 2021, but the FOD ultimately failed to release any such products. It is not clear why FOD is not popularizing these products.

According to the report, even when threat information is sent to “local partners” via email, that information “is not as widely disseminated as typical I&A intelligence products,” leading to the I&A “was unable to provide multiple states, localities, and Federations with predictive, actionable, and timely intelligence partners. ”

In a partially edited segment of the report, OIG details the difference in leadership roles at the I&A in the summer of 2020 and in January 2021. With regard to the unrest in Portland in connection with the ongoing demonstrations and demonstrations of racial injustice caused by proven murder belong to George Floyd by former policeman Derek ChauvinI&A “was criticized for compiling intelligence on American journalists reporting on the unrest as well as on nonviolent protesters.”

The result, the OIG reports, is a change in policy at the department that sets a much higher standard for intelligence sharing.

When we asked the Acting Deputy Secretary about the change in CETC’s reporting approach, she noted that there is a leadership difference for the summer of 2020 compared to January 6, 2021. She said that previous management has motivated those who collect to report anything related to violence, including potential threats or tactics and techniques used by individuals that may be involved. regarding violence. In contrast, the new leadership encourages collectors to issue intelligence reports on threats only when they believe the threats are real. This shift in direction has gone too far and has caused collectors to set very high thresholds for reporting information, said the acting Deputy Minister under his command.

In one case, an investigator gathered information “about an individual who visited the Washington, DC area and searched for locations for armed individuals to park their vehicles,” the report said. “The individual has previously posted online that he is going to the area and that he is Washington, DC”

However, one expert reviewer said that the collector’s report did not meet the department’s reporting thresholds. The investigator apparently sought to disseminate information by chaining orders, but by the time they were allowed to do so – on January 8 – it was already too late.

In another example, analysis of “seven observed or partially observed indicators of potential violence specifically related to protests planned for January 6” was used only. in internal briefings and not shared with other departments.

In an illustrative chart, the OIG report compares indicators of possible protest-related violence from the summer of 2020 in Portland, Oregon, with those prior to January 6. The investigation identified seven pre-violence indicators in Washington — compared with five related to Portland — the Jan. 6 analysis was unpopular.

Report OIG Portland v J6

As a result of the report, OIG recommends advanced training and other processes to improve timeliness

Read OIG report this.

[Image via YouTube screengrab.]

Is there a trick we should know? [email protected]

https://lawandcrime.com/u-s-capitol-breach/government-watchdog-report-finds-homeland-security-held-off-on-sharing-information-about-known-pre-jan-6-threats/ Homeland Security does not share threats before January 6

James Brien

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